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ABSTRACT 
We study whether communication can limit the negative consequences of the use of counter-
punishment in a public goods environment. The two dimensions of communication we study are 
norm communication and accountability, having to justify one’s actions to others. We conduct four 
experimental treatments, all involving a contribution stage, a punishment stage and a counter-
punishment stage. In the first stage there are no communication possibilities. The second treatment 
allows for communication at the punishment stage and the third asks for a justification message at 
the counter-punishment stage. The fourth combines the two communication channels of the second 
and third treatments. We find that the three treatments involving communication at any of the two 
relevant stages lead to significantly higher contributions than the baseline treatment. The 
detrimental effect of allowing for counter-punishment is neutralized in the presence of 
communication possibilities. We find no difference between the three treatments with 
communication. Separately norm communication and being held accountable work equally well and 
we find no interaction effect from using them jointly. We also relate our results to those of other 
treatments without counter-punishment opportunities. The overall pattern of results shows that the 
key factor is the presence of communication. Whenever it is possible contributions are higher than 
when it is not, regardless of counter-punishment opportunities.   
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1. Introduction 
 The possibility of inflicting material punishment has been found to play an important role in 
improving cooperation in experimental environments (Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; 
Sigmund, 2007). However, it has also been shown that the presence and use of material punishment 
can have negative side effects of various kinds.  
 One of the drawbacks of the presence of punishment is that it may lead to breakdowns of 
cooperation. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) provide an interesting example of this. In their 
experiment, a day care centre started charging a small fine to parents who arrived late to pick up 
their children. Surprisingly, this resulted in an increase in the number of parents arriving late. Fehr 
and Rockenbach (2003) report similar results. They present evidence from a trust game, showing 
that trustees reciprocate less when they face the threat of punishment. Appealing only to extrinsic 
motivations may lead to crowding out of intrinsic motivations to cooperate (Deci & Ryan, 1985, see 
see Bowles & Polanìa-Reyes, 2011, for a survey), and to “moral disengagement” (Bandura, 1991).  
Second, undesirable effects of material punishment can be caused by a dysfunctional use of 
it, like when punishment is directed at high contributors to a public good, a phenomenon also 
known as antisocial punishment (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Hermann et al., 2008; Gächter 
and Herrmann, 2011) or when, in an environment in which counter-punishment is possible, it takes 
the form of revenge, i.e., when it is directed towards punishers (Nikiforakis, 2008; Denant-Boemont 
et al., 2007; Balafoutas et al., 2014, Cinyabuguma et al., 2006). Third, the actual use of material 
punishment can also lead to the reduction of welfare for the group involved due to an excessive use 
of resources to inflict punishment. In many experiments, the incurred costs of punishment 
outweighed the gains from increased cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Herrmann et al., 2008; 
Egas & Riedl, 2008).  
In our view, the detrimental effects of punishment and counter-punishment observed in the 
laboratory can be largely explained by the way in which these mechanisms are modelled in 
laboratory experiments. In natural environments punishment is typically meted out by reprimand, 
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blame, criticism, gossip, and derision, enforcing strategies that naturally express social disapproval 
and signal norms (Ellickson, 1991; Boehm, 1999; Ostrom, 2005; Wiessner, 2005; Boyd et al., 
2010). By contrast, laboratory studies have usually modeled punishment only by allowing players to 
castigate each other by the imposition of material costs. When represented in these terms 
punishment is severely limited in its function of teaching people what the social norms governing 
the situation are, where by social norms we refer to prescribed behaviours shared and enforced by a 
community, and inform individuals about how they should behave (Cialdini et al., 1990; Bicchieri, 
2006; Conte et al. 2013; Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). It does not make it possible to transparently 
convey the necessary information from which subjects may learn what constitutes socially 
prescribed conduct. This opacity of social norms does not help individuals to identify the prescribed 
conduct and may cause an overuse of punishment and trigger revenge as a reaction to punishment 
acts not recognized as legitimate (Faillo et al. 2013; Boyd et al., 2010).  
As defined by Tyler (2006), legitimacy is “a psychological property of an authority, 
institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, 
proper and just” (p.375) and is a fundamental element governing social interaction.1 Machiavelli 
argued that political stability depends directly on the legitimacy of the government itself: pure 
power is impotent; its stability depends on voluntary acceptance, and voluntary acceptance depends 
on its legitimacy (see Machiavelli, 1985 [1513]).  The concept of legitimacy has a long history, yet 
no single dominant conception as emerged. An interesting perspective is the one claiming that 
social norms are the foundation upon which legitimacy rests. Zelditch argues “something is 
legitimate if it is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a 
group.” (Zelditch 2001, p. 33). Following this perspective, a natural way of legitimizing the use of 
punishment is by identifying it as a way of reinforcing norms and righting in violators.2 Then if 
                                                 
1
 Legitimacy is also important in contexts unrelated to public goods provision. Brandts, Cooper and Weber 
(forthcoming) study the relations between leadership and legitimacy. They find that elected leaders are significantly 
better at improving outcomes than randomly selected ones, ceteris paribus. 
2
 Villatoro et al. (2014) use experiments and agent-based simulations to study an environment where the legitimacy of 
punishment is conveyed by the number of punishers. 
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punishment is perceived as legitimate, it will be more effective and less costly in boosting voluntary 
cooperation than if it has to rely on coercion only. 
Andrighetto et al. (2013) provide experimental evidence that when material punishment is 
used together with norm communication, i.e., messages about the prescribed conduct, it leads to 
higher and more stable cooperation at a lower cost for the group than when used separately. 
Combined with material punishment norm communication has the additional effect of preventing 
the detrimental effects of punishment both on cooperation and group’s earnings and of significantly 
reducing anti-social punishments. Andrighetto et al. (2013) interpret their evidence by arguing that 
when material punishment is complemented with norm communication both the instrumental 
decision-making and the norm psychology humans are provided with are appealed to, resulting in 
successful human cooperation. Norm psychology is a cognitive machinery to detect and reason 
upon norms and the consequences of their violation that is characterized by a salience mechanism 
devoted to track how much a norm is prominent within a group. In their results “norm 
communication boosts cooperation and material punishment serves to maintain it.” 
 In this paper we study the effects of two types of communication: (1) norm-communication 
and (2) accountability. We do this in the context of a public good game with punishment and 
counter-punishment. Nikiforakis (2008) showed that given the possibility of counter-punishment, 
punishment ceases to lead to higher contributions. Here we study the possibility that the detrimental 
effects of the use of counter-punishment may be limited if certain types of communication are 
possible.   
 The public good game we use has three stages, a contribution stage, a punishment stage and 
a counter-punishment stage, common to all treatments. We conducted four experimental treatments: 
(1) material punishment and counter-punishment by itself, (2) material punishment combined with 
communication at the contribution stage and counter-punishment (3) material punishment and 
justification message at the counter-punishment stage and (4) material punishment combined with 
communication at the contribution stage and justification message at the counter-punishment stage. 
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 More specifically, in treatments 2 and 4, subjects may combine material punishment with 
communication, consisting in the possibility of asking for a specific contribution levels and sending 
a message with pre-specified normative content; this is what we refer to as norm communication. In 
these treatments, subjects can perceive punishment as legitimate, i.e., as a way of enforcing norms. 
Here we follow the design used in Andrighetto et al. (2013) and are interested in the effect of 
legitimate punishment in promoting cooperation and reducing possible detrimental effects, such as 
counter-punishment reactions and welfare erosion.  
  In treatments 3 and 4, players who decide to punish somebody at the counter-punishment 
stage have to send a free-form message to the counter-punished persons. Here we are interested in 
the effects of accountability, that is, of the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called to 
justify one’s beliefs, feelings and action to others (see Tetlock, 1992).3 Xiao and Tan (2014) use a 
truth-telling game to study whether the use of punishment – not counter-punishment - is more likely 
to be consistent with social norms when there is a justification requirement. They find that the 
presence of justification pressure leads to punishment being more likely to be perceived as signaling 
norm violation and also to more truth-telling. Here our focus is on whether the need for justification 
can help neutralize the potentially negative effects of counter-punishment. The idea is that the anti-
social use of counter-punishment may be curbed by the fact that it is hard to justify that such a use 
is legitimate.  
 We find that the three treatments involving communication at any of the two relevant stages 
lead to significantly higher contributions to the public good than the baseline treatment. The 
detrimental effect on cooperation levels and earnings of allowing for counter-punishment is 
neutralized. We find no difference between the three treatments with communication. Used 
separately norm communication and being held accountable for one’s action work equally well and 
we find no interaction effect from using them jointly. Our results also show that there are no 
                                                 
3
 In other contexts it has been shown that this expectation affects the likelihood of people making correct decisions 
(Vieider, 2011; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Brandts and Garofalo, 2012). 
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significant differences in the use of punishment and counter-punishment between the four 
treatments.   
 The results are consistent with the notion that receiving messages about what constitutes 
socially prescribed conduct influences punishment legitimacy and this lowers the 
probability/(severity with which) that subjects will counter-react to it, by taking revenge for 
received punishments. At the same time, pure pressure of justification may enhance the norm 
salience by encouraging one to think about audience’s beliefs and expectations about what one 
should do (Tetlock, 1985). Justification pressure may enhance people’s willingness to comply with 
norms by leading them to consider others’ expectations about the socially prescribed conduct. 
When people are required to provide a justification for their actions or views, they will be motivated 
to adopt the socially prescribed conduct, in order to prevent or avoid possible objections and 
negative evaluation by others, i.e., bad reputation. Since taking revenge against those that 
legitimately punish constitutes a deviation from a social norm, justification pressure may lead to a 
reduction of counter-punishments against legitimate punishments.  In addition, the need for 
justification may also cause a reduction of counter-punishment against participants who contribute 
little or do not punish low contributors. Although, in these cases one can justify the use of counter-
punishment in normative terms, participants may nevertheless limit their use of counter-
punishment, due to the destructiveness of its use. 
We also compare the results of our four treatments with data from two treatments without 
counter-punishment possibilities, previously reported on in Andrighetto (2013). In both of these 
treatments there is a contribution stage and a punishment stage, but no counter-punishment stage. In 
one of the two treatments there is the possibility of norm communication, while in the other 
treatment it is not possible.  
We are not able to replicate the result of Nikiforakis (2008) that the mere presence of 
counter-punishment leads to lower contribution levels. Moreover, we find that given the possibility 
of eliciting norms, either directly by communicating norms or indirectly by asking subjects to 
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justify their own actions, the presence of counter-punishment possibilities does not necessarily lead 
to a decrease in cooperation levels. On the basis of the evidence from all six treatments we conclude 
that the organizing principle of self-governance is whether or not individuals are informed about 
social norms and the consequences of their violations and not whether counter-punishment is 
possible or not. 
 
2. Experimental Literature on the Effects of Counter-punishment 
 In the seminal paper on the effects of counter-punishment Nikiforakis (2008) points out that 
the existence of only one punishment stage in many experimental studies “deprives subjects of the 
opportunity to take revenge for imposed punishments - an opportunity that exists in almost every 
decentralized interaction in practice” (p. 92). He conducts experiments with a public good game 
with three stages: a contribution stage, a punishment stage and a counter-punishment stage. While 
in the punishment stage every player can punish any of the other players in the counter-punishment 
stage players can only punish those who punished them in the preceding stage. The data show that 
approximately one quarter of all punishments is retaliated. The threat of revenge weakens subjects’ 
willingness to punish free riders. As a result, cooperation breaks down and groups have lower 
earnings in comparison to a treatment without punishments where free riding is predominant. 
Nikiforakis pessimistically concludes that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities 
individuals cannot self-govern themselves through punishments and that the existence of central 
authorities is necessary to sustain social order.  
 In a complementary study based on a similar design, Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) create 
different information conditions to explore the relative strength of the effects of counter punishment 
as revenge towards those who punished them and as punishment of low punishers in the punishment 
stage. They find that people use counter-punishment as revenge, but also to punish who fail to 
punish low contributors. Overall, they find that, as in Nikiforakis (2005), the possibility of counter-
punishment leads to lower levels of cooperation. 
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 Balafoutas et al. (2014) provide evidence on the effects of third-party punishment and 
counter-punishment in a one-shot three-player game. In their game, player B can take money from 
player A in a way that increases earnings inequality.  Player C can then punish player B. The study 
compares behavior with and without a third stage in which player B can now counter-punish player 
C. The results show that many B players are willing to counter-punishment and that the threat of 
counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the use of punishment. However, the existence of 
counter-punishment does not have any effect on selfish (non-cooperative) behavior by player B. In 
this sense, it is not a positive force in this case either.   
 Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) study the effects of counter-punishment in an 
experimental environment in which the number of counter-punishment rounds is endogenously 
determined by participants. It turns out that feuds are rare in these experiments, because people use 
strategies that avoid the breakout of feuds. They find that when long feuds are possible people’s 
willingness to engage in altruistic punishment is greatly reduced. Cooperation rates decline over 
time leading to also to a decline in earnings relative to a treatment in which altruistic punishment 
cannot be retaliated. Nikiforakis et al. (2012) also study feuds in relation to normative conflict and 
find similar results. 
 Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) study how the possibility of counter-punishing can mitigate the 
effects of punishers frequently punishing high contributors (anti-social punishment) and, hence, 
“creating perverse incentives”. In their experiments, the existence of a counter-punishment stage 
reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order 
“perverse” punishment. They find that the existence of punishment does not lead to an increase in 
efficiency. 
  To the best of our knowledge there is no previous study on whether communication leads to 
the elimination of the detrimental effects of counter-punishment opportunities. 
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3. Experimental Design 
3.1. Procedures 
 Our experiments were conducted at the LINEEX laboratory of the University of Valencia. A 
total of 192 participants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students from the University 
of Valencia and voluntarily participated in our experiment. Special care was exerted to recruit 
students from many different disciplines to increase the likelihood that the subjects had never met 
before. Each participant was allowed to take part in only one session. On arrival, participants were 
immediately led to separate cubicles. Instructions on general behavior in the lab and specific 
instruction about the game to be played were read by a mother tongue laboratory assistant. The 
experiment was programmed by using the z-tree platform (Fischbacher, 2007).4 
 
3.2. Treatments 
In each of the four treatments, twelve fixed groups of four subjects interact over thirty rounds, 
divided in three blocks of ten rounds. The first ten (1-10) and the last ten (21-30) rounds are 
identical across all treatments, whereas rounds 11-20 are all distinct across treatments. Participants 
were told from the start that there were three blocks of ten rounds, but were only informed about the 
rules for each block at the beginning of that block.  
In every round of rounds 1-10 and 21-30, each member i of a group independently chooses an 
integer contribution level, Ci, between 0 and 20, with the following payoff:5 
Pi = 20 −Ci + 0.4(C1 +C2 +C3 +C4 ) 
  After each round all the members of the group are informed about the contribution levels of 
each of the other three members. Since players’ identities persist, subjects can trace one another’s 
behaviour throughout the rounds. In all four treatments behaviour in rounds 1-10 is supposed to 
replicate with our procedures the well-known result that in a simple public goods game contribution 
                                                 
4
 The instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
5
 This function is the same as the one used in Fehr and Gächter (2000) and in Nikiforakis (2008). 
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levels invariably decay over time (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Behavior in rounds 21-30 will inform 
us about possible spillover effects of the treatment conditions in rounds 11-20. 
 Rounds 11-20 of Treatment 1 consist of three stages. In stage 1 participants play the public 
goods game introduced above and then get feedback about the individual decisions of others. As in 
Fehr and Gächter (2000), in stage 2 of each round participants can assign an integer amount 
between 0 and 10 punishment units to each of the other group members. Each assigned punishment 
unit costs the punished member 3 units and the punishing member 1 unit. After the punishment 
stage has finished participants get feedback about the punishment that has taken place. Each 
punished group member is informed about the ID of all punishers at the end of each round.6 In stage 
3, called the counter-punishment stage, participants can, after having received feedback about 
punishment, punish again. As in stage 2, each punished group member is informed about the ID of 
all (counter)-punishers at the end of each round.7 We will refer to this treatment as “punishment and 
counter-punishment.” 
 Rounds 11-20 of Treatment 2 consist of three stages, of which stages 1 and 3 are identical to 
those of Treatment 1. In stage 2 of Treatment 2 participants have, after each round, the opportunity 
to both assign costly punishment points as in Treatment 1 and send a normative message that has no 
payoff-consequences for any of the players of the group (we refer to it as norm communication). 
The content of messages has two components: the required contribution level “One should 
contribute X” (indicating the demanded token amount between 0 and 20) and a message providing a 
justification for contributing, which could be one of the following three options:  “because 1) in this 
way we are all better off; 2) it is what one should do; and 3) if not, it will have consequences for 
you.”. These options capture three different reasons for contributing: 1. achievement of a joint 
                                                 
6
 This is different from Nikiforakis (2007) in which, after each round, each subject was only informed about the total 
quantity of punishment points assigned to him. 
7
 There were no restrictions on who could punish whom in both stages 2 and 3. This is again different from Nikiforakis 
(2008) in which each individual had the opportunity to punish only those who punished him. Nikiforakis (2008) allows 
punishment in the second round only for the purpose of counter-punishment, i.e., avenging punishments received), but 
not for the purpose of punishing those who did not sanction free riders. 
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benefit; 2. a sense of duty; 3. a purely individualistic motive.8 We will refer to this treatment as 
“sanction and counter-punishment,” where the term sanction refers to the combination of peer norm 
communication and material punishment. 
Number Name Characteristics 
1 Punishment and Counter-punishment No communication 
2 Sanction and Counter-Punishment Communication at the Punishment Stage 
3 Punishment and Counter-Punishment with Message Communication at the Counter-punishment Stage 
4 Sanction and Counter-Punishment with Message Communication at both Stages 
 
Table 1: Treatments with counter-punishment possibilities. 
 
 Treatment 3 has stages 1 and 2 identical to those of Treatment 1 and a stage 3 which is 
different. If a player decided to use counter-punishment in stage 3, she was asked to write a 
message to each of the persons she punished (we refer to it as communication aimed to explain 
one’s action). Specifically, a chat box opened on the computer screen and the player had to 
introduce some text. It was clearly specified that the message had no payoff-consequences for any 
of the players of the group. In addition, in the instructions we wrote that the message was 
completely open, but that it was not allowed to identify oneself or to send offensive messages.9  We 
consciously chose this minimalistic way of asking for a reaction, since any more explicit request or 
even the use of the word ‘justification’ would have been too leading.10 We will refer to treatment 3 
as “punishment and counter-punishment with message.” Treatment 4 combines the two 
                                                 
8
 A treatment similar to our sanction treatment is used by Noussair and Tucker (2005) who study experimentally the 
joint effects of what they call formal and informal sanctions. Formal sanctions consist in assigning material punishment 
points like in our set-up. Informal sanctions consist in the possibility of assigning disapproval points to others without 
any material consequence (see also Masclet et al., 2003). These informal sanctions are a way of giving a negative 
rating, more or less disapproval, to other group members’ decisions. The authors find that being able to use both types 
of sanctions leads to a higher increase in cooperation than their separate use. Cason and Gangadharan (forthcoming) 
study the interplay between communication, informal agreements and punishment in an experimental environment with 
non-linear payoffs and find that communication with informal agreements have a positive effect on cooperation 
whereas peer punishment does not. In addition, peer punishment is unnecessary if communication is possible. 
9
 Indeed, it was possible for a player to type only one character into the chat box for the message to be acceptable, 
although we did not make this explicit to participants. 
10
 Xiao and Tan (2014) use a somewhat more pushy way of asking for a reaction. Their formulation in the instructions 
was: “Person X must write a message to explain his/her and the explanation must be related to Person Y’s behavior.” 
Our procedure is more in the sense of asking somebody “what do you have to say?” 
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communication possibilities of treatments 2 and 3. We will refer to treatment 4 as “sanction and 
counter-punishment with message.” Table1 summarizes the information about the four treatments 
just discussed. 
 
4. Hypotheses 
 Our hypotheses are motivated by previous evidence about the effects of communication and 
by the literature on norms and legitimacy presented in the introduction. We highlight here that our 
design is a rather complex one, involving actions at three stages and communication of different 
kinds at some of the three stages. We therefore focus our hypotheses on the effects of 
communication on the bottom line of the interaction, contribution and earnings levels. We 
formulate two sets of hypotheses about them. 
Hypothesis 1: 
a. Contribution levels are higher in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1. 
b. Contribution levels are higher in Treatment 3 than in Treatment 1. 
c. Contribution levels are higher in Treatment 4 than in all other Treatments. 
 
 Hypothesis 1a is inspired by the evidence in Andrighetto et al. (2013). In the two-stage 
design used there the possibility of communicating at the contribution stage lead to higher 
contributions. We conjecture that the possibility of counter-punishing in the current design will not 
undo this result, since the use of counter-punishment will be restrained by the fact that the norm of 
contributing will be made salient by norm communication and substantially followed. There will 
then not be the need to punish or to counter-punish. Anti-social counter-punishment will also be 
discouraged by the salience of the norm. 
 Hypothesis 1b is based on the notion proposed in the introduction that accountability in the 
sense of having to justify one’s actions may lead participants’ to think about others expectations 
about socially prescribed behavior and to act in a way that avoids negative evaluations by others. 
Observe that we do not have a hypothesis pertaining to the comparison of contribution in 
Treatments 2 and 3, since we do not have an a priori about the relative strength of the two types of 
communication. Finally, hypothesis 1c is based on the intuitive notion that communication taking 
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place through two channels will have a stronger impact than when it only operates through one 
channel.   
    Hypothesis 2 is a translation of Hypothesis 1 into earnings levels, where we posit that the 
effects of communication will be strong enough to lead to higher earnings through a sufficiently 
high increase in contribution levels and the limited use of punishment and counter-punishment, with 
the corresponding limitation in the destruction of resources. 
Hypothesis 2: 
a. Earnings levels are higher in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1.  
b. Earnings levels are higher in Treatment 3 than in Treatment 1. 
c. Earnings levels are higher in Treatment 4 than in all other Treatments. 
 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2 pertain to the overall outcomes of the interaction in the different 
treatments.  We now discuss possible hypotheses about punishment and counter-punishment. We 
start with counter-punishment since studying the interaction between communication and counter-
punishment is the initial motivation for our work. In treatments 3 and 4 we expect the need for 
justification to lower the use of counter-punishment with respect to treatment 1. The conjecture for 
treatment 2 can not be based on the impact of the need for justification. Instead, we think that the 
salience of the norm due to the possibility of asking for high contributions by sending a normative 
message will lead to high contributions and an overall climate of cooperation that will make 
punishment and consequently counter-punishment appear as pointless and unjustified. 
 Our final hypothesis pertains to the level of counter-punishment. As mentioned above, given 
the rather complex design of our experiment, our hypotheses are mostly about the bottom line of the 
interaction. However, with respect to counter-punishment levels we do have the specific conjecture 
that the lack of accountability for its use in treatment 1will lead to a higher use.  
Hypothesis 3: 
 Counter-punishment levels are higher in Treatment 1 than in all other three treatments.  
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5. Results 
 We begin by presenting the results pertaining to the levels of contributions to the public 
good and then move to the results about earnings levels and to the effects of punishment and 
counter-punishment.  
5.1 Contribution to the Public Good in the Presence of Counter-punishment 
 Figure 1 displays the contribution levels in the four treatments involving counter-
punishment. During rounds 1–10 contribution levels decline in all treatments, with average 
contributions being 8.44, 11.14, 8.22 and 9.18 in the punishment and counter-punishment, the 
sanction and counter-punishment, the punishment and counter-punishment with message and the 
sanction and counter-punishment with message treatment respectively. Pairwise non-parametric 
tests show that contribution levels in treatment 2 is higher than both in treatments 1 and 3. Given 
that in rounds 1-10 all four treatments were identical any differences can only be random.  
 
Figure 1: Average contribution levels in the four treatments with counter-punishment 
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 For rounds 11–20, one can see in the figure that three of the treatments have similar levels, 
while a fourth treatment has a noticeably lower level. Average contribution levels are 10.03, 15.03, 
15.42, and 14.05 in the punishment and counter-punishment, sanction and counter-punishment, 
punishment and counter-punishment with message required, and sanction and counter-punishment 
with message required treatments respectively. In this case pair-wise non-parametric tests  find that 
contributions in treatment 1 are significantly lower than in each of the other treatments, whereas 
there are no differences between the other three treatments (p-values: 1-2, p=0.0116; 1-3 p=0.0056; 
1-4 p=0.0423; 2-3 p=0.9020; 2-4 p=0.7676; 3-4 p=0.7119). In terms of the hypotheses presented in 
section 4, we find support for hypotheses 1a and 1b, but not for 1c. 
 In the last ten rounds, when punishment, normative message, counter-punishment and the 
opportunity to justify their own actions are switched off, contributions decay in all four cases to 
average levels of 5.68, 8.12, 9.24 and 8.53. Observe that contribution levels of the punishment and 
counter-punishment treatment are always the lowest. However, now only the difference between 
treatments 1 and 3 remains significant. 
 Comparing average contribution levels between ten-round blocks within treatments we find 
that for treatment 1 there is no significant difference between blocks 1 and 2 and while for all other 
treatments there is a significant increase from block 1 to block 2. We find that the three treatments 
involving communication at any of the two relevant stages lead to significantly higher contributions 
than the baseline treatment. The detrimental effect of allowing for counter-punishment is 
neutralized in the presence of communication possibilities. We find no difference between the three 
treatments with communication. Separately norm communication and being held accountable work 
equally well and we find no interaction effect from using them jointly.  
 Table 2 shows the results of two panel data regression models with fixed effects at the 
individual level and clustering at the group level. In both models the endogenous variable is the 
contribution level in block 2 (rounds 11-20). In model 1 we only have categorical independent 
variables, where the case in which neither message is possible is the omitted category. First, one can 
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see that the round variable is not significant, as already suggested by the rather flat shape of the data 
series shown in Figure 1. More importantly, one can see that all three variables corresponding to 
messages have a positive and strongly significant coefficient. Pair-wise tests of differences between 
the three coefficients can not reject the null hypothesis of no difference (t2 – t3: p=0.812; t2 – t4: 
p=0.625; t3-t4: p=0.467). 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Round 0.106 
(0.0784) 
-0.0711 
(0.0728) 
Message at Punishment Stage 5.003*** 
(1.714) 
5.270*** 
(1.809) 
Message at Counter-punishment Stage 5.386*** 
(1.557) 
5.879*** 
(1.669) 
Messages at both Stages 4.017** 
(1.972) 
4.265** 
(2.040) 
Lagged Punishment  -0.182 
(0.124) 
Lagged Counter-punishment  0.0666 
(0.0958) 
Constant 9.445*** 
(1.151) 
10.51*** 
(1.211) 
Observations 1840 1656 
Number of Participants 184 184 
 
 
Table 2: Contribution levels in block 2 as a function of communication possibilities 
  
 In model 2 we have added lagged punishment and lagged counter-punishment to control for 
some time effects.  As one can see these variables do not have a significant effect on contribution 
levels and their inclusion does not substantially affect the coefficients of the three message 
variables.  As for model 1 pair-wise tests of differences between the three coefficients can not reject 
the null hypothesis of no difference (t2 – t3: p=0.728; t2 – t4: p=0.634; t3-t4: p=0.418).   
 Our main contribution in this paper is the study of environments involving counter-
punishment possibilities. However, it is also interesting to relate our results here to those of two 
other treatments previously reported in Andrighetto et al. (2013). The experiments reported in that 
paper were conducted with the same subject pool and in the same lab as the ones corresponding to 
the treatments of Table 1. In addition, the instructions were the same except for a few differences. 
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The two treatments form Andrighetto et al. (2013) that we refer to are called punishment and 
sanction. Both these treatments only have the contribution stage and the punishment stage, that is, 
they lack the counter-punishment stage. The treatment called punishment has a punishment stage 
just like Treatment 1 above and the treatment called sanction has a punishment stage just like 
treatments 2 and 4 above, that is, participants can both impose costly punishment with material 
consequences both for the punisher and the punished subject and request a particular contribution 
level together with sending a normative message that is cost free.  
 
Figure 2: Average individual contribution levels, comparing treatments with (Pun+Count; Sanc+Count; Pun-
CountMes; Sanc+CountMes) and without a second punishment stage (Punishment and Sanction). 
 
 Figure 2 displays the contribution levels in 6 treatments, 4 with a counter-punishment stage 
and two without it (punishment and sanction). For rounds 11-20, average contribution levels are 
10.03, 15.03, 15.42, 14.05, 10.65 and 14.46 in the punishment and counter-punishment, sanction 
and counter-punishment, punishment and counter-punishment with message required, sanction and 
counter-punishment with message required, punishment and sanction treatment respectively. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Av
g 
Co
n
tri
bu
tio
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
Round
Punishment Sanction
Pun + Count Sanct + Count
Pun + CountMes Sanct + CountMes
 18
 There is no significant difference between the two treatments with no communication (MW: 
1-Pun: p=0.8625). In contrast contributions in the sanction and counter-punishment, punishment 
and counter-punishment with message required, sanction and counter-punishment with message 
required and sanction treatments are significantly higher by 50%, 53.8%, 40.1%, 44.3% 
respectively, than in the punishment and counter-punishment treatment in which no communication 
is allowed (MW: 2-Pun: 0. 0178; 3-Pun: 0. 0056; 4-Pun: 0 .0648, 1-Sanc: 0.0326).  
 At the same time, there are not significant differences between the sanction treatment, in 
which norm communication is allowed but only one stage punishment is present, and the other 3 
treatments, in which both communication (i.e., message about the prescribed conduct and/or 
message justifying counter punishment) and a second punishment stage are allowed. Differently 
from Nikiforakis (2008), contribution levels are not always lower in the presence of counter-
punishment opportunities (MW: 2- Sanc:  p=0.8294; 3- Sanc: p=0.6033; 4- Sanc: p=0.9509). 
 We can now summarize our findings about contribution levels in the following two results: 
Result 1: When communication of any form is possible (i.e., norm communication or 
communication aimed to explain one’s action), contributions levels are significantly higher 
than when it is not possible.  
 
Results 2: The presence of counter-punishment opportunities does not necessarily imply a 
decrease in contribution levels.  
 
5.2. Earnings 
 We move directly to looking at the earnings levels, since they constitute the bottom line of 
what we are interested in. If communication in the presence of counter-punishment only led to 
higher contribution levels, but not to higher earnings levels, one could say that effectively it is not 
very useful.11 After this we will look at how punishment, counter-punishment and the two types of 
communication are used. 
                                                 
11
 As already mentioned in the introduction, in some environments the presence of punishment opportunities of 
different kinds has led to higher contributions, but lower earnings. 
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Table 3 shows average earnings levels per block and per treatments, including both the four 
treatments involving counter-punishment and the two treatments without it, previously reported in 
Andrighetto et al. (2013), where the latter are shown in italics. Starting with the comparisons 
between the four treatments involving counter-punishment we find that in block 1 earnings levels of 
treatment 2 are significantly higher than in treatments 1 and 3. This difference is purely random, 
since in block 1 the instructions are identical for all treatments.   
We now move to block 2, which is our primary focus. Figure 1 reveals that in the initial 
rounds of block 2 contributions in the three treatments with communication are growing while in 
the punishment and counter-punishment treatment the average level of the block is reached more 
quickly. As will be shown below, punishment is also stronger in early rounds. We therefore test for 
treatment differences in earnings using the data from rounds 16 to 20. We find that there are no 
differences in earnings between the three treatments involving communication (i.e., Sanction and 
Counter-Punishment, Punishment and Counter-punishment with Message, Sanction and Counter-
punishment with Message). In contrast, in the Punishment and Counter-punishment treatment the 
average earnings are significantly lower than in the other 3 treatments, with p=0.016, p=0.003 and 
p=0.074 for the comparisons with treatment 2, 3 and 4 respectively.12 In relation to the hypotheses 
presented in section, our evidence is consistent with hypotheses 2a and 2b, but not with 2c.  
Comparing earnings levels of the four new treatments with those of the two treatments 
without counter-punishment, we find that earnings in the Punishment treatment is significantly 
lower than in all treatments with communication and not significantly different than in the treatment 
Punishment and Counter-punishment. In contrast, earnings in the sanction treatment are 
significantly higher than in the Punishment and Counter-punishment treatment and the same as in 
all the other treatments involving communication (MW: 1-Pun: p=0.4529 ; 2-Pun: p=0.0081; 3-Pun: 
p=0.0179 ; 4-Pun: 0.0489; 1-Sanc: 0.0047 ; 2- Sanc: 0.2679 ; 3- Sanc: 0.0647 ; 4- Sanc: 0.2423). 
                                                 
12
 In block 3 earnings are still significantly higher in treatments 3 and 4 than in treatment 1, but earnings in treatment 2 
are not higher. 
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Result 3: The presence of counter-punishment opportunities only leads to a decrease in 
earnings when communication of any type is not possible. 
 
Treatment Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
1. Punishment and Counter- Punishment 25.0665 22.6425 23.40587 
2. Sanction and Counter-Punishment 26.68523 26.54677 24.87009 
3. Punishment and Counter-Punishment with Message 24.9325 25.65771 25.54538 
4. Sanction and Counter-Punishment with Message 25.51264 25.70964 25.11596 
Punishment 23.75 21.42583 22.25388 
Sanction 24.95812 28.0275 25.45025 
 
Table 3: Average earnings. 
 
Result 4: The possibility of communicating leads to significantly higher earnings, regardless 
of whether counter-punishment is possible. 
 
5.3. Punishment behavior and messages sent in the second stage  
  
Figure 3: Average number of punishment points sent in the four treatments with a second punishment stage, in rounds 
11-20 
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Figure 3 shows the average number of punishment points sent for the four treatments with a 
counter-punishment stage. We summarize: 
Results 5: There are no differences between the average numbers of punishment points in the 
four treatments.  
 
Who punishes who in the first punishment stage 
 At this point we know that there are no significant differences in punishment levels between 
the different treatments, but it remains what the patterns of punishment are and whether there are 
any treatment differences there. Figure 4 shows how the number of punishment points assigned 
depend on the difference between the contributions of the punisher and of the punished. Observe 
first that anti-social punishment, i.e. punishment of participants who contributed relatively much, is 
rather infrequent. Second, observe that the overall patterns of punishment are not much difference 
between the treatments. At a descriptive level the perhaps most notable feature of  Figure 4 is the 
relatively high bar for the punishment and counter-punishment treatments corresponding to a 
difference in contributions between 14 and 20. A possible interpretation is that a participant who 
contributes much more than another is somewhat more motivated and justified to punish and also 
perhaps less afraid of  counter-punishment. 
 
Messages sent in the sanction and counter-punishment treatment 
 Recall that in the first punishment stage of the sanction and counter-punishment and in the 
sanction and counter-punishment with message treatment, subjects can send to the other group 
members both material punishment points and a message with the following content, choosing 
between options 1), 2) and 3): “One should contribute X (indicating the demanded token amount), 
because 1) in this way we are all better off; 2) it is what one should do, and 3) if not it will have 
 22
  
Figure 4: Average number of punishment points sent as a function of the differences between the contributions of the 
punisher and of the punished in the four treatments with a second punishment stage, in rounds 11-20. 
 
consequences for you”.  Figure 5 displays the average required contribution level for the two  
 
Figure 5: Average required contribution level over rounds 11-20 in the sanction and counter-punishment and in the 
sanction and counter-punishment with message required treatment 
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relevant treatments. The average contribution levels required are 15.38 and 16.04, with no 
significant difference between the treatments. Interestingly, these are very close to the average 
contribution levels observed in these two treatments.  
The frequencies of the three messages sent are very similar for the two treatments. Message  
1 receives 71% and 72% in the two treatments respectively , whereas message 2 is sent between 10 
and 20% of the times and message 3 is sent in 10% or less of the cases. 13 
  
Results 6: There are no significant differences in the use of messages between the sanction and 
counter-punishment and the sanction and counter-punishment with message treatments.  
 
5.4. Counter-punishment Behavior and Messages Sent in the Third Stage. 
 Figure 6 shows the average number of counter-punishment points sent for the four 
 
Figure 6: Average number of counter-punishment points sent in the four treatments with a second punishment stage, in 
rounds 11-20 
 
                                                 
13
 The results for the messages are very similar to the ones reported in Andrighetto et al. (2013) for the sanction 
treatment. 
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treatments with a counter-punishment stage. There are a few spikes in the data, but overall the 
figure suggests there are no significant differences between the four treatments and this is what 
statistical tests confirm.  
 
Result 7: There are no statistical differences in average counter-punishment levels between 
the four treatments.  
 
 Figure 7 provides some evidence for our hypotesis that when perceived as legitimate, i.e., a 
way of enforcing norms, and when subjects are asked to justify their own actions, this lowers 
counter-punishment. It depicts what we call the intensity of counter-punishment, which is the 
average number of counter-punishment, given that some counter-punishment is administered (i.e. 
excluding all the zeros). One can see that the intensity of counter-punishment in the punishment and 
counter-punishment treatment is higher than in the other 3 treatments with communication.  
 
Figure 7: Intensity of counter-punishment sent in the four treatments with a second punishment stage, in rounds 11-20. 
 
Although the difference is not significant we take it as some evidence in favor of our hypothesis 3.  
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 Next we look at the relation between counter-punishment as a function of contribution 
differences. Figure 8 shows how the number of counter-punishment points assigned depend on the 
difference between the contributions of the punisher and of the punished. First, just as for the case 
of punishment anti-social counter-punishment is rare. Second, comparing the counter-punishment 
patterns across treatments the only striking feature of the data is the relatively high spike for the 
punishment and counter-punishment treatment at the far right of the figure.   
 
 
 
Figure 8: Average number of counter- punishment points sent as a function of the differences between the contributions 
of the punisher and of the punished in the four treatments with a second punishment stage, in rounds 11-20. 
 
Counter-punishment and justification messages 
The frequency of use of messages at the counter-punishment messages is completely parallel 
to the use of counter-punishment, since a message has to be sent if and only if counter-punishment 
is used. Therefore, its use does not reveal any additional information to that already shown. Figure 9 
shows the percentages of message sent, organized by content, in the sanction and counter-
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punishment and in the sanction and counter-punishment with message-required treatment, where 
every message has been classified into one of the categories.14 There are no striking differences. 
However, one can see that the blank message is sent more frequently in treatment 4. We conjecture 
that in this case an explicit message is perceived as less useful, since communication was already 
possible at stage 2, the punishment stage. Relatedly, observe also that the message asking for the 
maximum contribution of 20 tokens is more frequent in treatment 3 than in treatment 4, since 
communication in treatment 4 involves precisely the specification of a required contribution level. 
Note finally how friendly messages are quite frequent, something that has been observed in other 
experiments: when free-form messages can be used participants are typically friendly, perhaps to 
create an atmosphere conducive to cooperation.     
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Message content over rounds 11-20 in the punishment and counter-punishment with message required and 
in the sanction and counter-punishment with message required treatment 
 
                                                 
14
 The messages were coded independently from the authors. The labeling of the different message categories is self-
explanatory, except perhaps for Max/20 which refers to asking for the maximum possible contribution of 20. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
We find that the presence of counter-punishment is only detrimental to contribution and 
efficiency when communication is not possible.  The results of our study add to those of a number 
of other experimental results that show that the presence of communication very strongly affects 
behavior. A few examples of experimental work that highlight how communication matters in a 
variety of contexts are Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Brandts and Cooper (2007), Ellman and 
Pezanis-Christou (2010) and Brandts, Charness and Ellman (2012).  
Our results show that communication, when helping to elicit norms, enhances the ability of 
individuals to self-govern and prevents the occurrence of undesirable effects. There is no difference 
in average behavior between the treatments involving communication: norm-communication and 
accountability for the use of counter-punishment have the same overall effect and even the joint use 
of both communication possibilities does not improve on the separate use.  Norm communication 
allows punishment to be perceived as a way of enforcing norms and to gain legitimacy, while 
having to give account of the use of counter-punishment leads individuals to consider others’ 
expectations about the prescribed conduct and consequently to avoid possible critiques and negative 
evaluation by others.   
Moreover, if we consider the four treatments with counter-punishment and the two without 
it first reported in Andrighetto et al. (2013), we can say that the factor that organizes contribution 
and efficiency levels is the not the presence of counter-punishment but the presence of 
communication that allows norms to be made salient and norm psychology to be appealed to. Our 
results do not replicate the result of Nikiforakis (2008) that counter-punishment opportunities lead 
to a breakdown of cooperation and a reduction in group earnings, perhaps due to some differences 
in the procedures used. More optimistically, we show that self-governance is possible also in the 
presence of counter-punishment opportunities, provided that individuals take advantage of social 
norms and their ability to communicate and enforce them.  
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